Who Benefits from a Transatlantic Free Trade Agreement? Policy Brief #2013/04 by Schoof, Ulrich et al.
Dr. Ulrich Schoof
Program
Shaping Sustainable
Economies
Phone:
+49 5241 81-81384
Email:
ulrich.schoof@
bertelsmann-
stiftung.de
Dr. Thieß Petersen
Program
Shaping Sustainable
Economies
Phone:
+49 5241 81-81218
Email:
thiess.petersen@
bertelsmann-
stiftung.de
Prof. Gabriel
Felbermayr, Ph.D.
ifo Institut München
Phone:
+49 89 9442-1428
Email:
felbermayr@ifo.de
Po
lic
y B
rie
f#
 20
13
/04 Who Benefits from a
Transatlantic Free Trade
Agreement?
From a purely economic standpoint, the US and the entire
EU will profit from a dismantling of tariffs and non-tariff
trade barriers between both regions. The real gross domestic
product per capita would increase in the US and in all 27 EU
member countries. Also when one looks at labor markets,
the positive effects on employment predominate: Two mil-
lion additional jobs could be created in the Organization for
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) zone over
the long run. The public welfare gains of these economies
admittedly do stand in contrast with real losses in income
and employment in the rest of the world. On balance, how-
ever, the beneficial effects on economic welfare prevail.
Focus
Along with the US and the UK, crisis-
ridden Spain would also be a big
winner from a comprehensive free
trade agreement. On the other hand,
the countries that are not part of this
free trade agreement would have to
expect losses in real earnings, which
could be substantial in some cases.
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Tariff and Non-tariff Trade Barriers: Trade barriers are
measures that limit the exchange of goods and services
between countries. Tariff barriers primarily consist of tariffs on
importing products from abroad. Non-tariff trade barriers
restrict the importation of goods and services from abroad by
means other than tariffs. Examples include quality standards,
shipping and labeling requirements, technical or legal
requirements for imported products, and import restrictions
ranging from import quotas to bans on imports. Non-tariff trade
barriers also include subsidies of a country’s own exports
through tax advantages or financial assistance.
Since the 1990s, a free trade agreement
between the US and European Union (EU)
has been discussed time and again. At
least since the beginning of 2013,
negotiations regarding a transatlantic free
trade agreement seem to be within reach.
The goal for this type of free trade
agreement is to remove barriers to trade
between allied partners, thereby
intensifying the exchange of goods and
services between participating economies.
Deepening of trade is linked with the
expectation that production, employment
and income will increase in the countries
that are party to a free trade agreement,
thereby raising the citizens’ material
standard of living. However, would this
also be the case in the event of a yet-to-be-
negotiated “Transatlantic Trade and
Investment Partnership” (TTIP)? Which
economies would actually profit from an
agreement, which would not?
1. Regarding the method
of calculation
The goal of the simulations presented here
is to assess the economic effects of a free
trade agreement between the 27 EU
member countries and the US. The inves-
tigation seeks to determine what the ef-
fects will be on international trade flows,
quantities of goods and services produced
(in other words, the
real gross domestic
product), and labor
markets. It not only
considers the coun-
tries that would be
signing the agree-
ment, but 126 coun-
tries in all. This
comprehensive ap-
proach takes into
account the fact that
a bilateral free trade agreement between
the EU and the US will also affect the rest
of the world (called third-country effects).
The study here is limited and only consid-
ers economic issues. More far-reaching
aspects such as questions of data protec-
tion, consumer protection and protection
of intellectual property are expressly not
addressed here.
This study considers two scenarios. In the
first ­ the tariff scenario - we calculate
what the economic consequences would
be if all tariff-type trade barriers between
the EU and the US were dismantled. In the
second scenario - the liberalization sce-
nario - not only tariffs, but also all non-
tariff trade barriers are abolished between
the parties to the agreement. Both scenar-
ios are compared with a situation in which
there is no transatlantic free trade agree-
ment. The effects that result exclusively
from removing the tariff and non-tariff
trade barriers are calculated with the help
of a model developed by the ifo Institute
for analyzing free trade agreements (for a
detailed description, see Felbermayr et al.
2013).
Experiences with existing free trade
agreements are taken into consideration
in the estimation of trade effects that can
be expected. Examples of such agree-
ments include the North American Free
Trade Agreement (NAFTA, which involves
the US, Canada and Mexico) and the EU as
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tries that have a common market with free
traffic of goods and services without trade
barriers. With the help of econometric es-
timates, we can make statements about
the effects that the removal of trade bar-
riers will have on international trade—not
only between the parties to the agreement,
but also for the rest of the world. The fig-
ures we determine for the effects of free
trade agreements on trade are then inte-
grated into a simulation model that in-
cludes 126 countries, in order to simulate
the trade-creating and trade-diverting ef-
fects that a transatlantic free trade agree-
ment might have on the economies under
consideration. The related exports and
imports, in turn, have an impact on the
real gross domestic product numbers and
the level of employment in the individual
economies.
The following section briefly summarizes
the economic effects that would result in
the event of a free trade agreement be-
tween the EU and US. For this purpose,
the actual economic reality of the year
2010 is compared with a hypothetical real-
ity in which we assume that the two sce-
narios regarding a transatlantic free trade
agreement (tariff scenario and liberaliza-
tion scenario) were already in full effect in
2010. Thus, any adjustment processes,
which would realistically occur after the
signing of a free trade agreement, are ex-
plicitly omitted. The following briefly
summarized consequences are therefore
long-term effects. In addition, it should be
noted that all results presented in the fol-
lowing section exclusively describe the
isolated effect of a free trade agreement. In
other words, in economists’ jargon, these
are “ceteris paribus” calculations (Latin for
“all other things being held constant”).
2. Consequences for
Foreign Trade
Removal of trade barriers between the EU
and US makes imports less expensive on
both sides. Declining trade costs lead to an
increase in trade activities between the
two regions. At the same time, pre-
existing trade agreements—in other words,
the North American Free Trade Agree-
ment, for example, and/or the trade be-
tween member states of the EU—lose value
because the preferred status of the respec-
tive trading partner is less relevant. Thus,
the price for intensifying trade relation-
ships between the US and EU is a reduc-
tion of trade activities within the EU and a
decrease in foreign trade relationships
with most third countries. These effects
are illustrated by the example of Germany
and a few selected trading partners (see
Fig. 1). Since the tariffs in transatlantic
foreign trade are already very low, dis-
mantling the tariff barriers to trade (tariff
scenario) has only a very minor effect on
trade flows. By contrast, a comprehensive
free trade agreement that also removes
the non-tariff trade barriers (liberalization
scenario) would have considerably
stronger impacts.
3. Effects on Economic
Welfare Worldwide
In regard to people´s material living con-
ditions, trade flows are less relevant than
the trend in the real gross domestic prod-
uct per capita. This figure - hereafter re-
ferred to as “real per capita income” - is an
indicator of the gains or losses in econom-
ic welfare, which are related to a transat-
lantic free trade agreement. Because a ta-
riff scenario alone has only minor effects
Fu
tu
re 
So
cia
l M
ark
et 
Ec
on
om
yP
oli
cy 
Br
ief
 # 
20
13
/04
Fu
tu
re 
So
cia
l M
ark
et 
Ec
on
om
yP
oli
cy 
Br
ief
 # 
20
13
/04
04
Fu
tu
re 
So
cia
l M
ark
et 
Ec
on
om
yP
oli
cy 
Br
ief
 # 
20
13
/04 on trade, the following section will onlydeal with the comprehensive free trade
agreement. Figure 2 shows how the long-
term per capita income would change for
all 126 countries as the result of a transat-
lantic free trade agreement. The following
main developments can be observed in
this regard: The US shows the greatest
growth in real per capita income. There,
the long-term gross domestic product per
capita grows by 13.4 percent. The EU as a
whole also shows gains in economic wel-
fare. In the case of a comprehensive trans-
atlantic free trade agreement, the real per
capita income in all 27 member countries
is on average almost five percent higher
than without this agreement. Great Britain
shows the largest growth in income.
There, the real per capita income grows by
almost ten percent over the long term. The
main reason for this growth: Great Britain
already has a high trade volume with the
US and therefore profits particularly well
from a dismantling of trade barriers with
the US.
Other EU countries that profit from this
treaty well above average are small econ-
omies such as the Baltic States. Small
countries tend to export and import a
larger proportion of their gross domestic
product than large economies, because the
latter have a large domestic market and
are therefore less strongly tied to the in-
ternational division of labor. Since they
are more strongly integrated in foreign
trade, small economies also profit to a
greater degree from declining trade costs.
Most of the southern European countries
in crisis derive a greater-than-average
benefit from the free trade agreement. In
that regard, Spain shows the greatest gain
in income because it can replace the rela-
tively expensive imports from European
countries with cheaper imports from the
US. The related surge in purchasing power
increases the real gross domestic product
per capita. Thus, a transatlantic free trade
agreement would not widen the gap be-
tween the crisis-ridden southern European
countries and the other EU member states.
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ferences within the EU.
The EU countries that benefit less than
average from a free trade agreement be-
tween the EU and US include the large
economies of Germany and France. In fact,
of all the 27 EU countries, after the Czech
Republic, France is the country that shows
the smallest increase in real income per
capita due to its relatively small trade in
goods with the US.
While the US and EU member countries
benefit from a transatlantic free trade
agreement, most other countries suffer
from trade redirection effects. The intensi-
fication of trade relationships between the
EU and US results in these economies im-
porting fewer goods and services from the
rest of the world. This affects Canada and
Mexico to a particularly large degree be-
cause these two countries currently have a
free trade agreement with the US that will
lose value as the result of a transatlantic
free trade agreement. Shrinking exports
would cause long-term real per capita in-
come declines by 7.2 percent in Mexico
and by as much as 9.5 percent in Canada.
In Japan long-term real per capita income
would decline by almost six percent.
Losses in real income also occur in Euro-
pean countries that do not belong to the
EU.
Other big losers include developing na-
tions. The intensification of trade relations
between the EU and US reduces develop-
ing countries’ exports to these regions. In
particular, because of their geographical
location, countries in North and West
Africa that previously had strong trade re-
lations with the EU would have a hard
time finding alternative markets for their
export products. In this regard, however, it
should also be taken into account that
economic growth in the countries that are
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demand for products from the rest of the
world, which would then also increase ex-
ports from developing countries. These
effects on growth - in other words, the dy-
namic effects of a free trade agreement -
are not considered in the above calcula-
tions. Therefore, the negative impacts on
real per capita income could in fact be
lower. Regardless of that, however, we de-
termined that the world as a whole profits
from the free trade agreement at issue
here: The average real per capita income
rises by almost 3.3 percent. In view of this
global growth in income, there is a possi-
bility–at least, theoretically–that the win-
ners of the transatlantic free trade agree-
ment will compensate the losers.
4. Labor Market
Effects
Economic growth stimulated by
intensifying foreign trade also
affects labor markets. Because
of the relatively small effect on
trade from just abolishing tar-
iffs, there are no labor market
effects worth mentioning in the
tariff scenario. On the other
hand, a comprehensive trade
agreement between the US and
EU would result in a considera-
bly greater increase in employ-
ment in the economies that are
party to the agreement (see Fig.
3). The US and the UK benefit to
a particular degree, with almost
1.1 million and 400,000 addi-
tional jobs created, respectively.
For the crisis-ridden southern
European countries as well,
there is an above-average posi-
tive effect on employment,
which is then reflected in a corresponding
reduction in the unemployment rate.
While the unemployment rate in the
OECD declines by an average of 0.45 per-
centage points, in the four countries in
crisis, the decline ranges from 0.57 per-
centage points in Italy to 0.76 percentage
points in Portugal. In general, we observed
that countries currently affected by above-
average unemployment would see an
above-average decline in unemployment
in the wake of a transatlantic free trade
agreement. This agreement would there-
fore have a converging effect on the labor
markets as well. Like the effects on social
welfare, there are also losers when we
look at the labor markets. In the OECD
countries that are not included in the
transatlantic free trade agreement, jobs
are lost. On balance, however, the job-
creating effects predominate, resulting in
about two million more jobs over the long
term.
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/045. Conclusion andEconomic Policy Conse-
quences
Intensifying trade between the US and EU
would have positive effects on income and
employment in the participating econo-
mies, especially with a comprehensive
agreement that eliminates non-tariff bar-
riers as well as tariffs. A transatlantic
trade and investment partnership (TTIP)
would therefore be an important tool and
vehicle for increased growth and competi-
tiveness in the European Union, which is
still burdened by the financial and debt
crisis in many places - and therefore by
economic recession. Meanwhile, a trade
agreement of this sort does not increase
the economic disparities among EU mem-
ber countries. Southern Europeans, who
are particularly affected by the financial
crisis, would benefit more than average
according to the scenarios that are used as
a basis here. Since a precise scope of an
agreement is hard to assess, however, the
economic convergence idea for Europe
should be checked repeatedly during the
negotiations, and should not be lost from
sight.
Improvements in social welfare in the US
and EU do indeed stand in contrast with
identifiable real income losses in third
countries, including a number of develop-
ing countries. These negative effects need
to be avoided or reduced. Traditional trad-
ing partners of the two large economies, in
particular, should be included in negotia-
tions or get an early opportunity to con-
clude similar, compatible agreements with
these economies, if this has not already
happened. At the same time, the real
gains in social welfare for the western in-
dustrial countries should be an incentive
for adequately compensating losers of the
agreement, and for demonstrating readi-
ness to compromise in multilateral negoti-
ations. Transatlantic trade and investment
partnerships could and should serve as an
impetus, and not as a hindrance, on the
multilateral negotiations that have stalled
in the Doha Round.
Further Reading
• Felbermayr, Gabriel et al., Dimensionen
und Auswirkungen eines Freihandelsab-
kommens zwischen der EU und den USA,
Studie im Auftrag des Bundesministeri-
ums für Wirtschaft und Technologie, End-
bericht, Munich 2013.
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Policy Brief 2013/02: Green and fair economy –
a holistic concept for a sustainable economy
Solution approaches based purely on economics do not
lead to optimal success–at least, not in the medium to
long term. Rather, a sustainable economy requires an
equal consideration of the ecological and social dimen-
sions. The green economy concept, or, better said, the
green and fair economy concept, is in principle suitable
for, if not avoiding an economic and financial crisis as
experienced in the last five years, at least moderating its
negative effects. The important thing here is to inte-
grate the design of the concept as much as possible at
the political, economic and individual level.
Policy Brief 2013/03: A European Social Market
Economy? - Index Results
The ‘highly competitive social market economy’
represents the targeted common economic order of the
European Union as it is stated as a goal in the Lisbon
Treaty. Yet, this endeavor requires a mutual understand-
ing of which institutions constitute a modern social
market economy. The results of the Index of Modern
Social Market Economies (IMSME) show congruence
around a liberal market economy, but great diversity in
principles indispensible for a social market economy.
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